Part I - The Empirical Theory of Inquiry

Chapter 1 - Introduction

This report is on a study of descriptions of the phenomenon of inquiry by selected contemporary writers. The purpose here is not to present those descriptions again, nor to criticize them, but to understand, and describe, a common context in which these descriptions, criticism of them, and even this study, occur as products of consciousness involved in inquiry.

An assumption of this study is that diverse and disparate theories on the questions of inquiry can be integrated in a single systemic model, the ideas of which can be connected empirically to the descriptions of this group of writers and their predecessors. The connection I seek is not an ideological, historical, or critical one, but a systemic one. I hope to show that each of these authors has made a significant contribution to a singular understanding of inquiry as having a specific systemic structure that refers to empirically verifiable aspects of common experience.

This structure may be called theoretical, or even speculative, but its development will be shown to result from disciplined observation, induction, and verification that are entirely consistent with the descriptions considered and the observations on which those descriptions are based. Verification will also consider the empirical methods employed by each of these authors in developing their descriptions.

The polemics of human science, as contrasted with natural science, seems inextricably caught up in debate over whether inquiry is a matter of the mind or a matter of the body. An issue that epitomizes this debate is the question of how we are to understand the phenomenon of consciousness. Polarization of opinion on whether consciousness is relevant to science has split the debate into two camps: one subordinating body to mind, the other subordinating mind to body. As soon as the threat of subordination emerges, each camp engages in protection against the threat, a real problem in practical, socio-economic terms.

Debaters are sufficiently committed to a fundamental mind/body dualism inherent in any currently rational explanation of inquiry, that the most powerful critics consider any explanation that does not conform to this dualism ignorant. Consequently, a theoretical model with potential to resolve the debate, in other words, one that employs primacy of consciousness, is considered to be one of many relative theoretical structures proposed on the part of the "mind" camp.

I will be outlining here some fundamental methodological propositions without attempting any immediate justification. The acceptability of these propositions is to be judged, therefore, on the part they play in the structure as a whole that emerges from the study that follows.

Theory implies fact, and vice-versa. Theory consists in a literal body of logically interrelated ideas that refer to, describe, and explain intersubjectively verifiable real phenomena, in other words, facts. Authors' observed facts imply their respective theoretical frameworks, and their statements of theory necessarily imply facts. Theory and facts are therefore interdependent. It is precisely such interdependence in a literal body of theory that constitutes a systemic description. Any systemic body of theory has a determinate logical structure that is a statement of the real relationships between facts. Inquiry is the process of bringing systemic descriptions into agreement with observed facts. I believe that, so far, this discussion is in accordance with the principles of natural science.

Where the methodological propositions made here diverge from the principles of natural science lies in the ontological status of the phenomenon we call consciousness. In the terms of natural science, consciousness is not an intersubjectively verifiable real phenomenon. In fact, we do not all agree on exactly what consciousness is. Therefore, for purposes of this study, consciousness is stipulated to be ontologically prime. Its existence is axiomatic and a priori to any manifestation of reality. This proposition is distinct from and contrasted with natural science in which the material existence of reality is axiomatic and a priori to any manifestation of consciousness.

Given a context in which consciousness is prime, inquiry is a cyclical and iterative process of consciousness by which ideas are interactively brought into systemic agreement with reality, then interactively brought into agreement with literal expressions of those systems that are accessible to other consciousnesses, which collectively, and interactively, normalize these many expressions into literal statements acceptable to any consciousness as universal descriptions and explanations of reality. In the process of inquiry, the collective effect of many consciousnesses mediates and normalizes the efforts of individual consciousnesses in producing universal understandings of reality.

For natural science, once these universal understandings are in place, the only important function of inquiry is the application of understanding to the discovery of new and better tools. The absolute structure of the cosmos is known and science is interested only in applying the knowledge effectively. Questioning the absoluteness of the structure or the correctness of the process that created it is considered futile if not counterproductive. As a result, any effort to reexamine the foundations of inquiry, to make the system either more completely in agreement with the facts of reality as experienced, or to make theory of inquiry more consistent with other bodies of theory, must be carried out separate from natural science.

Complete and consistent may be taken as a succinct and initial description of the phenomenon of wholeness. We may say that inquiry expresses an open attitude regarding wholeness, always seeking to incorporate new experience into a consistent structure. On the other hand, systems that are closed have ceased to be inquiring systems. Intending toward wholeness is necessarily an attribute of any inquiring system. Yet, as we can see from the example of natural science, inquiring systems can be a combination of open and closed. Natural science is closed to questions of consciousness but open to new technology. Some inquiry into consciousness itself may be closed to mysticism but open to cultural explanations of behavior. Religious inquiry may be closed to inquiry for most people but open to a few qualified individuals. Thus we note that closure seeks to protect and preserve normalized universal structures while allowing inquiry within those structures.

Because this study is outside the axiomatic boundaries of the natural sciences by virtue of its ontological stipulation of the primacy of consciousness, natural science is closed to questions of this kind and most natural scientists will consider these results irrelevant. However, it is precisely this closure that necessitates this, and other research of its kind, in a broader context. This necessity can be understood in terms of the collective utility universal structures have for cooperative human behavior. The necessary utility involved in cooperation hardly needs to be justified. It is logically implied in every aspect of human existence. If universal structures are the guides for human conduct, and if structures could be described which would improve cooperative human behavior, then we have a moral, not to mention a practical, obligation to create these structures. This project may be outside the boundaries of natural science, but it is most definitely an essential part of human inquiry.

All authority seems infallible when it is crisp and new. However, considering the nature of all authority, we must expect that accumulation of experience will render it obviously fallible. Authority, as manifest in universal structures, must be continually tended if its efficacy is to be maintained. Unfortunately, in human history, this function has not been explicit, for the reason that for authority to be effective it must appear to be infallible. A great deal of human effort goes into maintaining this appearance of infallibility. Every ideal and universal structure tends toward answering absolutely the question: What am I and why am I here? No fallible answer to this question has ever been an adequate universal, yet no universal has ever been ultimately infallible; such is the nature of universals.

Although a theoretical system is derived from observed facts, these are not the only facts implicated. Theory is expected to predict facts, within the context of the theory, that have not yet been observed. A system of theory must account not only for all the relevant facts observed by a single observer, but also for those facts observed by others. Thus the project of inquiry involves the intentional expansion of all inquirers into the realm of observed and yet-to-be-observed facts, with the purpose of verifying a specific theoretical system.

However, as a theoretical system grows interactively with a set of facts, it begins to have implications for other, competing systems, even those others that may have seemed unrelated. Separate systems can develop that are not logically integrated, and possibly mutually exclusive, even when they are derived from similar sets of facts. Inquiry follows a direction of interest established by the logical structure of a specific theoretical system, in other words, the relevance of facts will be inherent in the structure of a specific system. That structure offers a single explanation of the systemic relationship between those facts that may contradict or conflict with other interpretive structures based on the same facts. The possibility of conflict is therefore fundamental to the project of inquiry and conflict cannot be resolved based on some ultimate or absolute reality, independent of human needs.

The only resolution to this dilemma must be along the lines either of morality and aesthetics, the affective needs of humans, or of practicality, human instrumental needs. Possibly the best resolution would establish a balance between affective and instrumental needs. In any case, resolving conflicts between disparate theoretical structures that are based on satisfying human needs becomes an intentional project. These conflicts are resolved only because we intend to resolve them, and we understand that effective resolution is indeed possible.

Theoretical systems comprise a set of propositions that are logically consistent, in other words, none of the systemic implications of any of these propositions contradicts or conflicts with the systemic implication of any other proposition. If the propositions of a system are not internally consistent, we can infer that the discrepancy lies in axioms fundamental to all of the propositions that are implied but not yet made explicit. Logical integration of inconsistent propositions is a matter of articulating these implied fundamental axioms and applying the ramifications to each of the propositions, thereby integrating them. This process is clearly not just a matter of attention to observed facts, but of our chosen interpretation of those facts. Integration of conflicting theoretical propositions is not a mechanical or tautological exercise but a creative and intentional effort to be invested in for its potential to satisfy human needs.

All verifiable knowledge involves systemic theory as described above. The fact that certain theorists deny that inquiry can be described in this way must be taken as evidence of their own chosen interpretation of the facts. All differences between these positions can be made clear by articulation of the axioms implicated in each of the theoretical systems. It is not a question here of whether a particular theoretical system is either "true" or "false." It is a question of which system is more desirable in terms of its ability to satisfy human needs.

An important purpose of this study is to verify this view of the process of inquiry by showing its development in human discourse. The thesis here is that implicated in widespread changes in contemporary society's interpretations of its experiences is a radical restructuring of the theoretical system that constitutes science. The hypothesis that will be tested in the investigation detailed here is that this restructuring is a result of the reciprocal interaction of recently established facts and our evolving understanding of inquiring systems.

The central focus of this study is the development of an adequately complete and consistent theoretical description of a wholistic system of inquiry. Part of this process will involve defining the ideal interpretations of which this theory is composed. Another part will describe the historical emergence of the theory in question from the body of documented ideas that preceded it. I will arbitrarily label the respective historically established positions as the realistic and idealistic traditions. By arbitrary, I mean that I will make no attempt to justify this use of these labels. The distinction, as I define it here, concerns an ontological privilege given respectively to either observed facts or ideal interpretations. I will attempt to show that a specific description of a system of inquiry can be seen to be emerging from both the realistic and idealistic traditions, and that the system we see emerging is what I describe as a wholistic inquiring system.

As an extension of the historical description, I will address the work of a select group of contemporary theorists. I will show how each author contributes to the hypothetical structure that I describe. I will show how the changes in position of these authors, distinct from traditional positions, can be understood as a basic change in theoretical structure towards a wholistic system of inquiry. An associated conclusion I will justify is the preferability of systemic representation in theoretical descriptions.

How the authors were chosen is an important concern. The objective is to compare and contrast evolutionary development of the theory in question with normal progress in theory of scientific inquiry. I have already defined inquiry as a mutual interaction between observations of fact and theoretical systems. I have chosen authors that epitomize conceptualizations of inquiry in these terms and whose arguments most clearly relate to fundamental problems of inquiry.

The first criterion for selecting theories of inquiry is specific concern that they be as diverse and innovative as possible. I note that even some of the most widely divergent and controversial theorists have something valuable to contribute to a single, integrated theory. Indeed, the value of a contribution may be directly related to its controversial features. Even though these authors are all contemporary, there seems to be little direct influence of one on the other. I have tried to select authors from genres that are not obviously engaged with each other, especially not explicitly engaged in the project of producing a common body of theory. Another criterion has been their attempts to describe inquiry completely and consistently, in other words, as a whole system. Even when an author's efforts are not entirely successful, the results emphasize descriptive elements that emerge as significant from the author's perspective.

This study is not a history of theory in any genre, nor a history of any important theoretical problem. Yet it must stand as an evolutionary extension of all thought that has preceded it regarding the nature of science. It is not a critical assessment of these authors or of the body of work in which they have been involved. I am not interested in their personal characteristics, or what other authors have said about them, except as those comments may serve to expand on the original work. Working solely with the authors' texts, I have extracted only that part which is important to me and to this project.

In the sense in which the terms "inquiry" or "science" are used in this study, these processes produce literal descriptions of organized systems in which ideal structures are associated with real facts and assumed as universal characteristics of an existing cosmos. These descriptions of systems focus the interests of many people on a limited range of facts: those that are relevant to the description. Facts outside this range are not a matter for legitimate inquiry. For such facts to become legitimate, their perceived relevance must change.

In descriptions of an author's experience and their theoretical conclusions drawn from that experience, I look for statements about the things that exist in their cosmos and the relationships between them. I also look for statements regarding the questions that arise concerning these things and their relationships, and how the author chooses an answer to these questions. In other words, I am interested in implicit or explicit statements in an author's text that describe, for me, the specific ontology and epistemology in use by the author. These metaphysical assumptions provide the foundations for theoretical structures.

At the margin of the interaction between theoretical structure and relevant fact, the relevance of certain facts creates questions that must be resolved by changes in structure. These unresolved facts I will label anomalies: facts that the theoretical system does not explain. In established theoretical systems, anomalies may be either explicit or implicit. One of the easiest ways to render a theoretical system consistent is to ignore many important anomalies. Of course such a system will be incomplete, but the disadvantages of incompleteness are not always apparent. Obtaining consistency is an internal effort that is difficult enough, and inclusion of unnecessary anomalies may cause unnecessary difficulties.

The first symptom that a theoretical system may be inadequate due to incompleteness is an increased and widespread interest in the relevance of anomalies. Resolution of such anomalies is evidence that a theoretical system has been significantly improved and is capable of expanded verifiable explanation. Not all anomalies are included, but are instead satisfactorily explained as irrelevant. This may never happen if such anomalies have never been made explicit. New experience has the potential to make irrelevant facts or implicit anomalies appear on the margin as explicit anomalies.

Restructuring theoretical systems to incorporate newly addressed anomalies can alter the original structure beyond the ability of a given culture to recognize it. While the need to internally improve theory by making it more consistent is generally accepted, the need for external improvements to make it more complete is highly resisted. In the former case we accept it and encourage it as evolutionary progress, but in the latter case we commonly reject and discourage it as revolutionary chaos. The latter is always the case when we attempt to integrate two or more well established but mutually exclusive theoretical systems. Consequently, newly emerging and integrative systems of theory commonly arise separate and isolated from established theory, which eventually vanishes, not by integration, but by attrition.

A currently well-established theoretical system implicates by its structure a conditional characteristic of human behavior labeled "rationality." Human behavior is rational in this system when it adapts itself to existing external conditions, adapting behavioral means to material ends so that those ends are most efficiently achieved. Again in this system, the relationships between these means and the conditions necessary to achieve these ends are known to be defined and verified exclusively by the methods of science. Simply put, for this system the only behavior that is rational is scientifically prescribed behavior.

I will show that, over the period of time that this theoretical system has been in force, accumulated experience has revealed the existence of significant anomalies associated specifically with this system, and that these anomalies are forcing changes in its theoretical structure.

This introduction defines the fundamental ideas of fact and theory, and describes the relationship between them. In the first two parts of this study I will describe the emergence, from established theory of inquiry, of a new structure that resolves anomalies described in detail by the authors that are cited. I will show by the use of systemic principles that significant anomalies associated with the traditional theory have been neglected, and that accumulated facts justify treatment of these anomalies in a new way, in other words, wholistically.

Rational knowledge takes the form of a unified, systemic whole. This whole is formed in each of distinct domains of experience, some of which are empirical and others that are not. I will label the non-empirical domains "interpretive." Interpretation depends largely on extrapolation and interpolation from empirical data to produce the unified, systemic whole. Interactively, producing the whole reciprocally affects the way empirical data will be considered. In other words, the interactive process between real data and interpretive data, or ideal data, rationally intends to produce a unified whole. Since this process as performed by the individual is iterated collectively, the data expressed collectively in literal form interacts with the collective interpretation of that data to form universals. Universals are then taken back by individuals as their personal understandings of reality.

Rationality assumes control over both observation of data and the interpretation of those observations that intends toward a systemic whole. Collectively, these controls constitute methodology. The research methodology used here is phenomenology, and assumes its associated ontological and epistemological bases. We can see from the foregoing discussion that there are general questions of ontology and epistemology involved in all domains of experience, and there are those questions that are specific to a particular domain, whether it is real, ideal, literal, or universal.

The empirical subject matter that concerns this study is selected as evidence of a particular structure that humans can be observed using in the process of inquiry. It is an empirical fact that humans refer to purposes, either individual or collective, toward which their actions are applied. It is also a fact that humans describe these purposes and their associated activities in literal forms that can be understood by other humans. No study of the evidence of human systems of inquiry could proceed without resorting to these literal forms, and attempting to resolve from them a unified systemic whole that describes any human inquiring system.

It is a fact that humans have ideas about reality (consciousness, for example) that cannot be observed in reality, and that these ideas are associated with their individual or collective purposes. The relationships between these ideas and the process of human inquiry will be the primary focus of this study. The relationship between purposes and action, mediated by ideas, will be labeled here as intentionality: the tendency toward rational integration of interpretations of observations into a systemic whole. This unified structure will be shown to be the ultimate purpose of inquiry.

Ideas must have a direct relationship to empirical data, in other words, reality, for those ideas to be useful in describing a universal structure. Since all empirical data is mediated by preformed ideas, we may infer that neither observations nor interpretations exclusively may be used as evidence of structure.

I will be looking for an ordered description of reality that results from observation, in conjunction with ideal interpretive frames of reference corresponding to the reality described. This will constitute the author's ontology. Relevance to the question of inquiry will be indicated by descriptions of the process of development of knowledge and the use of that knowledge in purposeful action. The interpretive frame of reference must adequately explain the observed reality. The qualifier "adequate" does not mean perfectly or indisputably because we understand the possibility of every explanation to emerge from a parochial perspective.

The interpretive frames of reference described by various authors may be of varying scope or applicability. They may be mutually irrelevant or even contradictory. They may be explicit or implicit. What is important is that each description provides a relevant perspective in constructing a unified whole. Each must, completely and consistently, describe inquiry as a process performed on certain content, under the necessary controls to achieve a purpose.

Descriptive frames of reference are fundamental to all inquiry, but no one structure exhausts the possibilities for ideal interpretations of real observations. Facts cannot be described without recourse to a structure, which has the function of defining the phenomena that are to be explained. Not only is the domain of reality involved, but also the domain of ideas, both intending to a specific purpose. It is only within such a structure, combining the real and ideal, that a literal description can be developed with the characteristics necessary to become a universal explanation.

Given an object (something real) situated in an ideal frame of reference, explanation requires describing the object as itself a whole system comprising interrelated parts, each of which can itself be described as a whole system with interrelated parts. In this context, an object can be either real or ideal depending on domain. It can also be either organic or mechanical. Systems can be described in organic terms or in mechanical terms, where constituent elements are or are not, respectively, necessary functional aspects of the whole. A mechanical whole (in other words, a tool) cannot be understood separate from the organic whole of which it is a part. A mechanical whole is always a part, the purpose of which is determined by the organic whole.

An organic whole has a purpose separate and distinct from the purpose of any whole of which it is a part. Organic wholes do not, a priori, share a single mundane purpose. Sharing mundane purposes is a specific organic function. Organic wholes have transcendental purposes and functions which all parts share. These purposes may extend to mechanical systems, but this is a matter of intent. In either case, a system may be decomposed into analytical elements related by analytical attributes described as precise systemic terms. Because systemic terms are ideal objects and are speculative, it is a mistake to assume any absolute relationship between systemic terms and real objects. The qualifier "analytical" stipulates the provisional nature of these elements and their attributes. Analytical elements and their attributes are established and determined by the ideal structure of the system as a whole and must be consistent with it as well as describing all real phenomena. Analytical concepts are ideal generalizations about real phenomena and their context. A whole ideal structure with lacunae due to missing real data is filled in by extrapolation and interpolation until such time as real data become available. The total ideal structure with its analytical concepts constitutes a complete explanation of real phenomena.

This study addresses a particular ideal structure in a particular phase of its rational evolution. Other possible ideal structures proposed as explanations are of interest only to the extent that they contribute constructively to this effort. However, given the explanatory structure for inquiry as it exists in its traditional form, several observers have noted inabilities of the existing structure to explain some contemporary observations. These weaknesses in explanatory power call the rationality of the existing system describing inquiry into question and create opportunities to make fundamental changes in the ideal structure.

The first step in restructuring our description of inquiry is to define it in systemic terms. Inquiry is the process by which the objects of reality are identified with analytical elements within an ideal structure producing an explanation of inquiry as a systemic whole. This study will focus on the quality of wholeness and its contribution to the process of inquiry as a real human activity. Since I will be describing how each author defines the analytical elements and the relationships between them, my interest will be in their respective ontologies. Since the preparatory work I have done for this study leads me to wholeness as a criterion for explanatory power of an ideal structure, I will be interested in their respective epistemologies. Both ontology and epistemology will be worked out in the real, ideal, literal, and universal domains. I will show that, although authors identify diverse analytical elements, interpretation of these elements converges on a single ideal structure that is a systemic whole.

A fact is understood here to be a verifiable literal description of a real phenomenon as an ideal element of a universal systemic whole. In this context, phenomena are products of individual consciousness. A fact, therefore, is a literal claim to universal status for the ideal meaning an individual has attached to a real phenomenon present to their consciousness.

[Note on the use here of "they" and "their" - I will use these terms in all places where it is conventional to use the phrases "he or she," "him or her," "his or hers," etc. I understand this usage is not grammatically correct, but I believe the complexities of conventional usage unduly distract attention from the subject under discussion.]

All theory that aspires to the ontological status of "scientific" is made up of facts, and the relationships between facts, in the sense used here. Clearly, systems of facts and the ideal structures in which they are embedded compete, on a collective and literal level, with other similarly described systems for this prime ontological status. They compete precisely because no such literal description of a system can ever completely and consistently describe all real human phenomenal data. These systems, which are propositions about the real phenomenal data, address only those facts that are relevant to a particular ideal structure, leaving perpetually open the possibility that any such system will ever ultimately describe all the data.

Methodology is the study of the axiomatic bases for the validity of factual descriptions and the ideal structures that explain them. As such, methodology explicitly addresses ontological and epistemological issues that are not empirical but are instead philosophical. These are the axiomatic foundations upon which ideal structures are erected. The specific form these axioms take is arbitrary because, being prime features of reality, nothing exists prior to them to which they can be causally linked, in other words, there are no prior conditions these forms can be judged to complete. In a sense, they are backwards extrapolations from what we know of reality to the origins of reality, never to be known and always to be guessed, but which provide the foundations for our understanding of reality. Beyond the mechanical necessity for axiomatic bases to be externally consistent with real experience and internally consistent logically, we want them to be instrumentally useful, aesthetically satisfying, and morally justifiable. In contrast with the mechanical needs, the latter organic needs are prior even to axiomatic bases. We might speculate that these are structural forms rising from beneath consciousness itself, from biological roots, to influence our axiomatic bases, but this speculation is itself evidence how forming axiomatic bases is a continuous process of looking behind and beneath what is real to form an idea of reality's origins.

In communities, societies, and cultures these axiomatic bases become taken for granted, assumed in real life. They become literally transparent, implicit in human discourse. People forget they exist even when they are foundational and fundamental to the most familiar understanding of reality. Therefore, since the form of these foundations determines the possible forms of the ideal structures they found, rationally and intentionally changing the ideal structures requires making these axiomatic bases explicit.

Consciousness is the universal medium of constitution, of origination of and for access to whatever validly exists. Consciousness is characterized by an intentionality that is manifest in a correlation between two separate realms: temporal psychological events and meaningful ideal entities. Continuing psychological events produce a repertoire of stable ideal entities that constitute reality. Experience is the continued interaction of psychological events with the established ideal entities. Thus, experience produces reality. The two prime constituents of reality are self and the category of other objects. The two prime perspectives taken by self are the mundane and the transcendental corresponding to a natural versus a phenomenological attitude. Mutually recognizing selves produce a shared reality, which they experience as the common world of their combined activities.

The purpose of phenomenology is to describe the phenomenon of consciousness and how it reveals the experienced world. Phenomenology is concerned with the presentation of subjective and intersubjective experience in itself. Transcendental phenomenology is thus the fundamental a priori science relative to the natural sciences, which individually translate the transcendental terms of phenomenology into mundane terms. Accounting for the very knowledge of reality, phenomenology offers the philosophical foundation for all the sciences. Phenomenology is not concerned with the ultimate bases for experience or reality, because no such bases can be part of consciousness. However, suspension of belief in the actual bases for an object of consciousness is not the same as denying they exist.

The universality of phenomenology stems from the characteristic that it does not compete with less mundane descriptions of reality. Phenomenology seeks to account for a world in which all such descriptions are possible and useful in describing the myriad subjectivities necessary to attain a transcendental perspective. Phenomenology is itself just such a perspective. By extracting the phenomenologically acceptable aspects of each author's position and combining them into a single, transcending position, these statements will have been successfully integrated.

As a result of the analysis done here, the different movements in the various fields of science, where they are different and not just proprietary articulations of the same movement, are revealed as distinct intellectual constructions founded on different metaphysical bases. The specific difference in metaphysical bases that seems otherwise irreconcilable is that of a phenomenological perspective versus an empirical perspective, mind versus body. However, this analysis has shown that the phenomenological perspective subsumes the empirical perspective and is not just mutually exclusive of it. This means that these two perspectives do not compete on the same level. While the empiricist is not necessarily interested in and does not understand the phenomenological perspective, the phenomenologist not only understands the empirical perspective, but also respects its efficacy in describing certain kinds of phenomena. Thus phenomenology itself informs us that there is no logical reason why empiricism and phenomenology cannot be concinnous, to use one word for phenomenological unity. When the phenomenological perspective and the empirical perspective are united functionally in pursuit of the same purpose, they can be said to have been integrated.

Phenomenological method specifically enables the integration of these diverse intellectual structures by reducing each of them to their irreducible essentials, where it can be observed that irreconcilable differences in lived experience of these phenomena do not necessarily exist. Obviously this implies an intention to integrate these diverse descriptions. For those who lack this prerequisite intent, integration may seem problematic and even incredible. Phenomenology predicts such a response from an observer who hypostatizes an explanatory theory that has been publicly acclaimed. Such a response is the consequence of an inability to adopt a phenomenological perspective, precluding the possibility of agreeing on a single description of reality through dialog. Conversely, we can see that the phenomenological perspective is instrumental in integrating diverse perspectives wherever they may occur.

This strategy is the basis for the major assumption that all the texts selected for this study are descriptions of different perspectives of the same experience. Based on this assumption, a single description is not only possible, but is also necessary for a complete and consistent understanding of the phenomenon. Translation of multiple texts into a single text in this way is not reductionistic because the combined statement is greater than the simple aggregate of the constituent texts. What emerges from the combined text is a transformation that enhances the power of all of the constituent descriptions.

Although we can see that these observers are describing different things, if one assumes an intent to integrate, one assumes these are different perspectives of the same thing. Based on this intention, it is possible and even reasonable to produce an integrated description from these two perspectives. Whether it is desirable or not is, in my opinion, a political question. By political I mean there will be an irreconcilable conflict between these two views only if either of them is seeking a position of absolute dominance. In my opinion, the situational basis for mutual exclusivity is a matter of proprietary interests in a specific perspective. A transcendent perspective will always serve to integrate diverse systems by describing the relationship between them. It is true, though, that those with proprietary interests will describe any description that aspires to transcendence as just another competing perspective. Those who must use these views to understand the world around them and actually make decisions based on that understanding must be the ultimate judges.