Chapter 9 Tentative Methodological Implications

I do not claim the description given here of the essential elements of an emerging rational structure is either complete or consistent. As with any theory, satisfying these criteria would depend on extensive use and refinement of the structure. The work completed here has defined and described the essential elements showing their historical evolution and the logical relationships between them. However, the significance of the structure as presented is relevant to many aspects of conscious experience. The particular form rational behavior assumes is manifest in both action and inquiry, and these functions themselves assume some form in every aspect of human experience. The discussion of rational structure offered here has supported the notion that both action and inquiry are more efficacious when approached in a disciplined way under the guidance of a rationally constructed and literally articulated methodology. In fact, the theory I have presented implies and justifies a particular methodology as the applied form of the theory.

Wholeness and Systemic Theory

Although this study has emphasized the disciplined development of practical theory that describes and explains established empirical facts, my discussion and the interpretations of the authors I have offered have frequently pointed to a relationship between this rational structure and metaphysical theory. This structure is related both ontologically and epistemologically to distinct metaphysical constructions of the phenomena of conscious experience, in particular realism and idealism. Understanding human experience necessarily recognizes and accounts for the existence of and the function of a diversity of such metaphysical constructions. A wholistic theory of inquiry (WTI) must explain the existence and function of diverse metaphysical structures. In doing so, WTI must itself offer a distinct but inclusive ontology and epistemology.

WTI stipulates consciousness as the infinite, universal, and eternal sine qua non of experience. However, this is not the objective consciousness of realism and idealism, but the subjective consciousness as experienced by a particular self. Given subjective consciousness as prime, WTI describes in objective terms how consciousness comes to fulfill a purpose that transcends consciousness, and how this function dominates the structure that fills consciousness. Fulfillment of purpose, or intentionality, is the foundation for any and all ontological structure, as well as being itself an ontological meta-structure. Functionality satisfies intentionality. Functionality is, therefore, the foundation for any and all epistemological structure, and is itself an epistemological meta-structure. Intentionality and functionality form the philosophical bases for WTI.

The qualities of abstract and concrete can be conceived as the ends of an infinite continuum, where the limits of human experience occupy a specific range within that continuum. However, we label only the end limits of our experience as abstract and concrete. These terms are very similar to the terms of this study, ideal and real. Both the abstract and ideal have a role in the realm of inquiry, in organizing the products of conscious experience. In the realm of action, the terms of inquiry have to be converted into terms of the concrete and real. The frame of reference common to both the realms of inquiry and action, and the domains of ideal and real, is the structure of functionality, where the elements of the structure have both ideal and real referents. Ideal referents are subjective (epistemological), while real referents are objective (ontological) within a functional frame of reference.

The structural elements constituting the functional frame of reference are those that are necessary and sufficient to rationally describe either action or inquiry. A more complicated structure would harbor redundancies, and the structure is logically irreducible. Within this structure is a normative dimension expressed as a causal interaction between a transcendent purpose and the controls required to achieve that purpose. Also within the structure is a conditional dimension expressed as objects contained in the structure in causal interaction expressed as change. Given conscious intentionality, this ideal structure fills with concrete referents that interact in accordance with this functional logic, in other words, systemically. These structural elements are depicted in what I have called the meta-model (Figure 25).

Consciousness constructs concrete, objective wholes within the functional frame of reference. These wholes are intended to be functionally relevant to the experiencing subject. However, in rationalized systems of wholes expressed literally, their descriptions can be functionally disorganized, making it difficult to understand the description wholistically. Moreover, the existence of an actor or subject may be ignored, discounted or even obscured intentionally by the describing consciousness.

Wholeness therefore constitutes a norm for systemic literal description, calling for its expression in functionally logical terms, in terms of the elements that form the functional frame of reference, in other words, rational structure. The description of a system is whole and rational when it conforms to the structure of the functional frame of reference. If no specific consciousness is explicit, as in technical mechanical descriptions, the function of the describing consciousness is necessarily implied. When the structural norm of wholeness is observed in systemic literal expressions, the resulting description itself forms a rational whole in another consciousness. Exclusive use of wholistic description makes systemic descriptions isomorphic, compatible, and resolvable into a single systemic whole.

Intent to integrate objective descriptions calls for observing the norm of systemic wholeness in all objective descriptions. Without this intent to achieve a common purpose, integration would be entirely coincidental and improbable. Integration of descriptions after the fact, as has been done in this study, is merely a demonstration of what is possible, not an illustration of what is necessary. Wholeness is possible, not necessary, as in any objective description. When it becomes necessary is when it is accepted as functionally instrumental in achieving collective purposes. Only by intent does wholeness become necessary. Intent, in this sense, must be inter- and intra-subjective as well as inter- and intra-collective. This is a lot to ask for a single methodological mandate. We can see from the example of the methodological imperatives of the natural sciences that such agreement is possible. To incorporate the norm of wholeness, only a change in those imperatives is necessary. The change I am proposing is a wholistic theory of inquiry that links and integrates the currently distinct realms of realism and idealism.

The philosophical position taken here stipulates a universe (in the broadest, most abstract sense of that term) that exists concurrently with and independent from conscious experience. Where it came from and where it goes is imperceptible, inconceivable, and inexpressible in human terms. Fortunately, no direct experience of the actual universe is necessary, or even relevant, to human existence. Consciousness has evolved its own means of getting along, to the best of its evolved ability to understand. Although it may be impossible to reduce the actual universe to what is necessarily real to us, all the conditions important to human have been identified during the process of evolution and defined by some aspect of conscious experience. These definitions are abstract to the point of being not consciously accessible, yet consciousness applies the concrete detail of experience to them, turning them into a world in which we act rationally, in other words, functionally. That we continue to exist supports an understanding that the real universe we experience stands in some sort of functional relationship to the actual universe we cannot experience. Human reality, under the influence of the ideal, expresses the possibilities and necessities of actuality sufficiently well that, with continued effort, we survive and prosper. However, it is crucial to our existence that we apply our energy in a way that conscious experience tells us is efficacious. This relationship is depicted in Figure 27.

Observing wholistic norms during the process of inquiry does not guarantee integrated rational structures. While wholistic inquiry does guarantee that a particular structure will be rational in the sense of being integrated and functional, diverse collectives will be more interested in internal rationality within a particular collective than in external rationality between collectives independently engaged in disciplined inquiry. Rational structures developed in mutual isolation will necessarily be unintegrated because integration can only result from mutual intent to integrate. Definitions of structural elements produced without such intent will necessarily diverge in their literal expressions. However, regardless of literal divergence, all rational structures will share the ontologically foundational functional structure. Having this foundational structure in common means that any structure that is rational will be isomorphic with all other rational structures at the foundational level.

However much literal expression of proximate purposes may diverge between human collectives, at the functional ontological level they are still isomorphic. Ultimate purposes for humans are identical even when the instrumental means collectives employ to achieve those purposes conflict. Ultimate purposes as literally articulated can seem to conflict when the expressions of ultimate purposes become confused with instrumentality. These conflicts can be the most serious because there may seem to be no possible transcendental level of inquiry allowing development of an inclusive rational structure. Conflicts that cannot be settled on the basis of the authority of a transcendental rational structure (organically) will be pursued on the basis of power (mechanically).

Organic rationality seeks opportunities from joining into collective wholes. Mechanical rationality seeks opportunity by breaking wholes down into mechanical parts that can be manipulated instrumentally by some assumed or implied organic whole. Mechanical inquiry can involve highly specialized mechanical skills that require much focused experience to develop. Consequently, disciplines of mechanical inquiry can become isolated from each other, employing esoteric and sometimes cryptic literal expressions, and completely losing any articulated organic connection with the collective in which they act. Understandings of organic connection that may be assumed in the process of inquiry, and implied in the products, may come to conflict with the instrumental purposes of other disciplines, or even come to conflict with ultimate purposes of a collective as a whole.

From the perspective of a wholistic theory of inquiry, it is understandable how a cult of realism might develop around a successful discipline of mechanical inquiry, and how the existence of the realistic cult might force the emergence of an idealistic cult to address the incompleteness of the mechanically oriented rational structure. Having a complete, wholistic, organic understanding of the systemic relationship between inquiry and action may be the only way to resist contemporary forces to be drawn into one or the other of these influential cults.

The competency of the mechanically inclined is not concerned with the existence of collectively shared, organically oriented, rational structure. For them, a specific organic structure is prior to, assumed in, and implied by every action they take. Their organic structure is internalized to the point of not being aware of what the common structure is, how it came to be that way, or even that it may be possible to change it. In fact, for the mechanically oriented, it is essential that the organic rational structure never change because it is so fundamental to mechanical rationality and foundational to their technical competence that any change in the organic rational structure threatens their very existence.

I have shown in this discussion how describing the coordinated actions of multiple conscious individuals involves reference to a collective normalized literal expression that unites each individual's assignment of ideal meaning to the real objects of conscious experience in a universal rational structure. I believe this universal rational structure, empirically verified here, can be called an emergent property of a collective consciousness. I believe the verified existence of this structure is evidence of a more inclusive consciousness that unites all participating consciousnesses into a single entity. I believe multiple consciousnesses, so united, constitute a "self." Within this self, it is irrelevant whether we call the process by which the universal rational structure is created "evolutionary biology" or "human science." The existence of the universal structure is both sufficient and necessary to define, and bring into existence, the self, a single organism that acts as a whole.

However, identifying a universal rational structure does not exhaust the possibilities for rational structure. Rational structures exist that are not universal. A universal rational structure is internalized and used exclusively, by a particular collective, as the basis for action. This structure might unite either a single human or a community of humans. This structure might be shared biologically, but it is clear from human behavior that development and sharing of rational structure is not only biological. The foundations for rational structure may be biological, in particular the ontologically prime characteristics of systemic functionality, but social interaction among humans erects a superstructure on this foundation in individual consciousness that joins individuals in a collective consciousness. In this sense, collective consciousness transcends individual consciousness.

Like the idea of rational structure, the idea of collective consciousness is an abstract concept requiring verification by data from conscious experience. Verification unites the data with the idea in an enduring whole, reconciling anomalies and justifying action. Verifying the idea of rational structure results in a theory of inquiry, an epistemological standard for rationality. Verifying collective consciousness results in a theory of action, an ontological standard for which there seem to be few expressive terms. Rational structure and collective consciousness are hypothetical or speculative forms offered for their potential instrumental value in improving understanding. Collective consciousness may offer a standard for morality, another normative term for cooperative behavior based on transcendent values.

The idea that there may be different levels of conscious behavior is a matter of metaphysical speculation. Collective consciousness seems to me to be a very fruitful idea for describing imagined relationships between more inclusive levels of organic cooperation. Inclusive levels of consciousness could imply inclusive levels of rationality, each associated with a reasoning self. The functional relationship of selves embedded in other selves may have a significant instrumental value in understanding human relations. However, the possibilities of such theory are almost completely discounted where there is no wholistic theory of inquiry. Speculative metaphysics has no significant value where inquiry is limited to mechanical rationality.

Just because we cannot prove the existence of collective consciousness by the logic of mechanical rationality does not mean such an entity cannot exist. No consciousness except our own is accessible to direct experience of its existence. Yet on the experiential basis of only one consciousness, our own, we construct generalizations allowing us to deduce the existence of other consciousnesses. This kind of a generalization is an example of metaphysical speculation that is only recently struggling to emerge in our culture. Accepting the ontological status of collective consciousness is no more absurd than accepting the existence of any other consciousness. It is simply a matter of uniting the idea with the facts of everyday experience.

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